

Illegal Aliens Smuggling To and Through Southeast Asia

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Introduction

The desire of millions of people to leave the People's Republic of China fuels a migration racket that spans the globe and smuggles Chinese into the United States — the preferred destination — as well as into Japan, Taiwan, Australia, Europe or anywhere that the migrants can attain their dream of a better life. Many of the illegal Chinese migrants travel to those destinations from “clearing houses” such as Cambodia, taking roundabout routes from Phnom Penh via Bangkok and on to the outside world.

But before they reach Cambodia, they have to travel overland from China's coastal provinces to Yunnan in the southwest -- and then down through Burma and/or Laos, since neither Cambodia nor Thailand share a common border with China. According to local and international law enforcement agencies based in Southeast Asia, the networks that smuggle people through the so-called Golden Triangle are basically the same as those that for years have been running the area's lucrative trade in illegal narcotics, and the routes — and contacts along the way — are also the same.

However, not all migrants are headed for more affluent countries in the West or East Asia (Japan, Taiwan). Large numbers also remain in Chiang Mai in northern Thailand, in Mandalay in Burma, and in smaller towns in northern Laos, where the influx of new settlers threaten to upset the sometimes delicate ethnic balance. According to local reports from the area, clashes between local people and recent Chinese migrants have already occurred in Kutkai in Burma's northeastern Shan State.

The problem is very difficult to tackle because of two very weak links in the chain: Cambodia, Burma and, to a lesser extent, Laos. Over the past decade, Burma's druglords have reached agreements with the country's military government according to which they can engage in any kind of business in exchange for cease-fire deals with the central authorities. This has enabled them to more than double Burma's drug production since the late 1980s — and to engage in other lucrative businesses such as illegal aliens smuggling.

In Cambodia, decades of civil war and genocide have devastated society and an attempt by the United Nations to restore normal conditions to the country has been only partly successful. As a result, all kinds of criminal gangs are taking advantage of Cambodia's weak government, chaotic conditions, and inexperienced and corrupt law enforcement agencies.

Laos is far more stable than both Burma and Cambodia, but it remains one of the poorest countries in the world, and therefore heavily dependent on any infusion of capital, legal or otherwise, from outside sources. In all those three countries — as well as in China itself and in Thailand — businessmen, politicians, corrupt local officials, and the criminal underworld have established a mutually beneficial relationship, and people smuggling has emerged as one of the most lucrative aspects of that symbiosis.

Chinese in the Golden Triangle

Burma is unique in Southeast Asia in having not just the usual immigrants from Fujian, Guangdong and other southern Chinese provinces, but also its own indigenous Chinese minority. These are Chinese who have ended up on the Burmese side of the border with China, in a district called Kokang, by an accident of history. A mountainous area in Burma's northern Shan States, Kokang has always been a buffer zone — or link — between Yunnan and Burma.

Although it remained part of China for centuries, Kokang's location in a remote corner of Yunnan made it impossible for the central government to control. But as trade between Yunnan and British Burma began to prosper in the late 19th century, the British became increasingly interested in

Kokang. The area was formally incorporated into British Burma by the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of February 4, 1897, although its inhabitants were almost exclusively Chinese of Yunnanese stock.¹

Related to, but distinct from, the people of Kokang are the Panthays, Yunnanese Muslims who are said to be descendants of Kublai Khan's Arab and Tartar soldiers who settled in the Dali area of western Yunnan and married local women. In 1855, the Panthays rose in rebellion against the Chinese emperor in Beijing. The uprising was eventually crushed with a heavy loss of life — and tens of thousands of Panthays migrated across the mountains into northern Shan States.

Speaking the same dialect as the Kokang Chinese, they settled in the surrounding hills. Deprived of land to cultivate, the Panthays became traders. Many continued south to northern Thailand and Laos, where they acquired a reputation as first-class muleteers and opium smugglers.² In China they are known as Hui and classified as a non-Han minority.

A second wave of refugees from Yunnan arrived in northern Burma after Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT) forces were defeated by Mao Zedong's Communists in 1949. Separated from the main force that retreated to Taiwan, thousands of soldiers from the KMT's 8th and the 26th Armies — and their families — crossed the border into Kokang, the hills north of Kengtung and other areas on the Burmese side of the Yunnan frontier. The KMT regrouped and rebuilt their regiments there with the help of the Taiwan government and American intelligence agencies, and tried on a number of occasions to re-enter China, only to be driven back again.³

For years, the Burmese army fought bitter battles in the northeast to dislodge the uninvited intruders. Success eluded the Burmese until the early 1960s, when China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) sent three divisions to defeat the KMT remnants in the hills of northeastern Burma. The campaign, code-named "the Mekong River Operation," broke the back of the Kuomintang in northeastern Burma. Beaten Nationalist soldiers retreated towards Thailand, where new military bases — and entire towns and villages -- were established.

Before the operation could be completed, however, the military seized power in Burma. The country was declared a socialist state and, under the banner of "the Burmese Way to Socialism," the government established a system in which 22 (and later 23) military-run corporations took control of the economy. The military takeover of private enterprise led to an exodus of businessmen and merchants, most of whom were non-Burmese.

Prior to the 1962 coup, there were several hundred thousand ethnic Chinese (mostly Cantonese and Fujianese) in Burma — migrants who had arrived during the British time by way of Singapore and Penang — but they were not as numerous as the Indians, who in the pre-World War II era made up more than 40 per cent of the urban population of the capital Rangoon.⁴ Among the Sino-Burmese, speech divisions and occupations overlapped: the Cantonese were carpenters, shoemakers and skilled artisans, while the Fujianese ran shops and small businesses.⁵ In the 1950s, there were four Chinese-language dailies and three weeklies published in Rangoon, and well over 200 Chinese vernacular schools in the country. Unlike the solidly anti-Communist, pro-KMT Yunnanese and Panthay (and refugee) population of the mountainous northeast, the urban Chinese were split along pro-Beijing and pro-Taipei lines.

The 1962 coup changed the situation dramatically. More than 300,000 Indians and perhaps as many as 100,000 Chinese left during the years between 1963 and 1967. All Indian and Chinese schools and newspapers had to close. But, as the economy deteriorated under the "Burmese Way to Socialism," the Indians — and the Chinese — who remained behind assumed control over the increasingly important black market.

Smuggling networks were established across Burma's borders, and, as Burma had very few legal commodities to offer in exchange for consumer goods from neighbouring countries, the illegal trade in opium sky-rocketed. Before the end of the 1960s, Burma had become the world's foremost producer of opium and its deadly derivative, heroin.⁶

The military needed a scapegoat for the collapse of the legal economy, and in June 1967, angry mobs went on a rampage through Rangoon's Chinatown. Chinese shops and homes were ransacked and looted, and many Sino-Burmese were killed. Breaking out in several cities, the riots were said to be a reaction to reverberations of the Cultural Revolution among the Beijing-oriented groups of Chinese in Burma. But they also came at a time when the country was facing an acute shortage of rice, and it was widely suspected that the riots were instigated by the authorities to deflect attention from their inability to deal with the crisis. The authorities did not intervene until mob violence got out of hand and even the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon was attacked.⁷

The military takeover — and the 1967 Chinatown riots — also provoked China to step up its support for the insurgent, pro-Beijing Communist Party of Burma (CPB). China began to send in mas-

sive amounts of arms, ammunition, medical supplies, and even military instructors and volunteers into northeastern Burma. Within less than ten years, this “new” CPB managed to establish a base area along the Yunnan frontier which measured more than 20,000 sq. km. and stretched from Mōng Ko and Kokang in the north, across the Wa hills and Kengtung all the way to the banks of the Mekong river. 15,000-20,000 heavily armed troops — most of them local hill-tribe recruits commanded by Burmese communist ideologues — guarded this de facto buffer state between Burma and China.

Apart from a desire to spread revolutionary ideology to Burma, there was also another reason why China had decided to support the CPB: the revitalised “People’s Army of Burma” smashed all the KMT’s remaining bases in northeastern Shan State, from where they had been able to conduct cross-border raids and intelligence gathering forays into Yunnan. The very last KMT units were forced to retreat down to the Thai border, where they settled in the Nationalist Chinese towns and villages, which had been established in the early 1960s.

From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, other groups of Chinese refugees also arrived in northeastern Burma from Yunnan and also other parts of southwestern China: peasants, workers and intellectuals who fled first the Great Leap Forward and, later, the Cultural Revolution. Lacking proper identification papers and immigration documents, nearly all of them ended up in areas of northern Burma which were not controlled by the government in Rangoon, but by various rebel armies — including, ironically, even the CPB. To make a living in a rough environment where employment opportunities were extremely limited, many became poppy farmers, opium smugglers, or both.⁸

But it was Thailand which saw the most dramatic economic development as the influx of KMT remnants and their Yunnanese allies into its northern provinces altered the entire socio-economic structure of the entire country. The first major change in the north had actually occurred by the arrival of the railway in the 1920s. After more than ten years of hard work, sweat and blasting through the hills, the first train steamed into Chiang Mai, and the King in Bangkok could expect to control his northern Thai subjects more effectively.

But with the railway came, not exactly surprisingly, thousands of Chiu Chao (or Teochew)-speaking Chinese from Bangkok. With trading partners already well-established in the capital, they swiftly took over most of the commercial activities in the north as well. They could soon be seen in shops and company offices all over Chiang Mai, though bearing Thai names and being just as assimilated as their cousins in Bangkok.

Then came the rustic Yunnanese from the hills of the Golden Triangle — and with them also the opium and the heroin; they were the muleteers, the local traders and the people with business links stretching as far north as Kunming. But their role in the drug trade ended in Chiang Mai and, to a lesser extent, in Bangkok. The big business, and the regional and the international networks, were firmly in the hands of the Chiu Chao, although the accidental link-up between the two groups led to the emergence of an underground network of business contacts that stretched from China proper, across the Golden Triangle, and on to Bangkok, and the rest of the region and the world.

Recent Migration

The situation in Burma — and the Golden Triangle — underwent even more dramatic changes in the late 1980s. It began with a massive uprising for democracy that swept nearly every town and major village in Burma in August-September 1988. Millions of people demonstrated against military rule and socialism, which had brought the country to the brink of total economic collapse, and for a restoration of the democracy and the free-market economy which the country had enjoyed before the military takeover in 1962.

The demonstrations were met with unprecedented brutality. The military stepped in, not to overthrow the government — which the generals in any case controlled — but to shore up a regime overwhelmed by popular protest. Thousands of unarmed protesters were gunned down in the streets of Rangoon and elsewhere, and a new junta, called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), assumed power.

In the wake of the 1988 massacres, nearly 10,000 pro-democracy activists fled Burma’s urban centres for the border areas near Thailand, where a multitude of ethnic insurgents were active. The military feared an alliance between the ethnic rebels along its frontiers and the pro-democracy activists. However, these groups along the Thai border (Karen, Mon, Karenni, and Pa-O) were unable to provide the urban dissidents with more than a handful of weapons.

None of the ethnic groups could match the strength of the CPB, whose 10,000- 15,000 troops along the Sino-Burmese frontier in the northeast. Unlike the ethnic insurgents, the CPB also had

vast stockpiles of Chinese-supplied arms and ammunition. Although the aid from China had virtually ceased by 1980, the CPB's stockpiles were enough to last for at least ten years of guerrilla war. But very few dissidents, who belonged to various pro-democracy groups and had no sympathy for the CPB's old-fashioned Maoist policies.⁹

However, that changed in early 1989 as a situation potentially which could have been extremely dangerous for the SLORC emerged in March and April of that year. The hill-tribe rank and file of the CPB — led by its military commanders, who also came from the various ethnic minorities of its northeastern base area — mutinied against the party's aging, mostly Burman, political leadership.¹⁰

Ethnic Wa troops from the CPB's army stormed the party headquarters at Panghsang on the Yunnan border. The old leaders and their families escaped to China, and the former CPB army soon split along ethnic lines and formed four regional resistance armies. Ethnic minority rebels along the Thai border sent a delegation to Panghsang to negotiate with the main Wa component of the CPB mutineers soon after the breakup of the old party. The possibility of a linkup between the four groups and the ethnic minority groups along the Thai border, as well as with the urban dissidents, worried the SLORC.

But the authorities in Rangoon reacted faster, and with more determination, and with much more to offer than the ethnic rebels. Within weeks of the CPB mutiny, the chief of Burma's military intelligence, Lt.-Gen. Khin Nyunt, travelled to the border areas to meet the former communist commanders, and alliances of convenience were forged between Burma's military authorities and various groups of mutineers. In exchange for promises not to attack government forces and to sever ties with other rebel groups, the CPB mutineers were granted unofficial permission to engage in any kind of business to sustain themselves. Rangoon also promised to launch a "border development programme" in the border areas, and sought — and received — funding from various UN agencies for it.

The threat from the border areas was thwarted, the potentially most dangerous threat to the survival of the SLORC had been neutralised — but the consequences for the country and the outside world have been disastrous. "Business" in northeastern Burma inevitably meant opium and heroin — and within a year of the CPB mutiny and the subsequent cease-fire agreement with the government, American and Chinese intelligence sources claimed that there were more than 20 new heroin refineries in the former CPB's area. At the same time, Burma's annual opium production jumped to 1,500-2,000 tons, from 800-900 before the CPB mutiny.

Former communist commanders became some of the richest men in Burma. Profits from the drug trade were invested in real estate, hotels, construction, and even supermarkets in Rangoon, Mandalay, and other cities.¹⁰ Some of the military commanders of the former CPB army were ethnic Chinese, from Kokang and elsewhere, and they now linked up with the already existing networks of smugglers and drug traffickers that spanned Southeast Asia.

Direct trade with China also became legal, as Beijing and Rangoon had signed an official border-trade agreement in August 1988 — already before the mutiny — and soon the cross-border trade in various commodities was estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars per year. Trade and commerce — both legal and illegal — replaced revolutionary ideology as the main pursuit of the people living along the Yunnan frontier and in the Golden Triangle.

One of the most enterprising of the new "economic" warlords on the Yunnan frontier was Lin Mingxian, a.k.a. U Sai Lin, a former Red Guard from China who had joined the CPB as a volunteer in the late 1960s. After the 1989 mutiny, he retained political and military control over his area in the hills north of Kengtung — where he built up a formidable drug syndicate with links not only in Burma but also to China, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Lin was also one of the first of the new entrepreneurs in northeastern Burma who realised that there was perhaps as much money to be made in illegal aliens' smuggling as the drug trade — and he concluded that the networks that for years had smuggled drugs from the Golden Triangle could just as easily bring illegal immigrants to the West.

Thousands of young Chinese, especially from Fujian province, have over the past few years paid up to US\$30,000 each to be smuggled to the United States. A significant number of them leave China through the long and porous border with Burma, across the former CPB areas where Lin and others hold sway. Once they have reached Thailand, they continue by ship to the United States.

The most publicised incident of such smuggling occurred in June 1993, when an ill-fated ship called the Golden Venture ran aground in New Jersey, and a number of its passengers were drowned when they tried to reach the shore through heavy surf. It carried 300 Chinese illegal

immigrants, and all of them had come down through Lin's territory to Thailand.¹¹

One illegal Fujianese, who was interviewed in the United States in 1993, recounted the difficulties of leaving China. After having made a down payment to agents of well-organised syndicate in Fujian, they set off: —“There were about seventeen of us, all male. The youngest was about 18, the oldest in his mid-40s. There were smugglers taking us from town to town. After we had reached Kunming in Yunnan, we waited for about a month for a person to take us across the China-Burma border. We were all afraid of being arrested by Chinese border patrols. We were lucky: we all went through without any problem. After we crossed the border, we walked through the Golden Triangle to northern Thailand. A tribal soldier carrying a rifle guided us through mountains and forests. We travelled at night and slept during the day. It was raining most of the time and we could do nothing but lie on the dirty wet ground to try to sleep. We ate twice a day, mostly dried food. We saw some corpses along the way and believed that these people, like us, had tried to go to Thailand.”¹²

Lin has assigned one of his most experienced officers, a former CPB commander called Bo Tin Win, to organise the escort of these people to Thailand. The fee is 10,000 Chinese Yuan per head. Lin and his gang may not be the main players in the trade in humans, but they are a link in the long chain from the villages of Fujian to the Chinese restaurants and factories in New York and San Francisco, where most of these illegal immigrants end up. And Lin no doubt has made several million from this business. In more recent years, people fleeing the Three Gorges Dam project and the 1998 floods in the Yangtze river basin have also sought refuge in Lin's area, where they have been given special ID cards, which he — in accordance with the cease-fire agreement with the government in Rangoon — is authorised to issue.¹³

Burma and Cambodia: Clearinghouses for Illegal Immigrants

The opening of the border between China and Burma — and the flourishing trade that has come in its wake — has led to an influx of Chinese into northern Burma that is so massive it threatens the demographic balance of the area. When a person in the northern Burmese city of Mandalay dies, his or her death is not reported to the authorities. Instead, that person's relatives send his identity card to a broker in Ruili or some other border town in Yunnan. There, the identification papers are sold to anyone willing to pay the price.¹⁴ The Chinese buyer's photo is substituted on the card, and he can then move to Mandalay as a Burmese citizen.

In this way, thousands of Yunnanese have settled in towns in northern Burma, bought property and set up businesses. Their local partners are often Kokang Chinese, who are bona fide citizens and, of course, speak the same dialect as the Yunnanese immigrants. The latter now pervade commercial life in Mandalay, including the trade in precious stones, jade and narcotics. The presence of almost unlimited amounts of drugs money, which have to be laundered, has pushed up prices of real estate beyond the means of most ordinary Burmese. Not surprisingly, this new wave of Chinese migration has re-ignited old anti-Chinese sentiments among many Burmese, feelings reflected in cartoons and short stories in local Mandalay publications.¹⁵ The possibility of a repeat of the 1967 anti-Chinese riots cannot be ruled out, if the immigration continues unabated.

While the Yunnanese tend to stay in Burma, illegal immigrants from other parts of China use the same local contacts to transit the country on their way down to Thailand — and on to the West. Widespread corruption in Burma — and the division of the northeastern parts of the country into semi-autonomous fiefdoms ruled by former rebel warlords — has made Burma a favourite route from which to leave China and reach the ports and airports of Thailand.

The number of Chinese “tourists” coming to Thailand has risen sharply in the past few years, according to official Thai statistics. In 1998, for instance, arrivals from China rose by 23 per cent over 1997 to 432,995, the biggest increase for any nationality entering Thailand.¹⁶ While many of them are genuine tourists or visiting relatives, a fair number of them never return to China, Thai intelligence sources say. The illegal immigrants settle in Thailand — the influx of Chinese over the past few years to the northern Thai city of Chiang Mai has been almost as massive as to Mandalay — or they continue on other travel documents to the West.

In May this year, Thai police colonel Wissanu Maungprasee admitted publicly that large numbers of illegal Chinese transit Thailand on their journey to the West. He also said that up to 90 per cent of Chinese arrested on charges of carrying bogus travel documents in Thailand were natives of Fujian.¹⁷ But because of US pressure on Thailand to halt the traffic — and subsequent raids by Thai police on “safe houses” and dubious “travel agencies” in Bangkok, the human-smuggling rackets have recently moved some of their activities to Cambodia, where effective law enforcement

is almost non-existent. The would-be illegal immigrants wait for their new documents in Cambodia, but the actual forgeries are still done in Thailand, where printing is of much better quality.¹⁸ Once the documents are ready, they continue by air to other destinations, and finally reach the United States, Canada, Western Europe or Australia through back-door routes. But many Chinese also choose to stay in Cambodia. The total Chinese population of Cambodia is estimated at 350,000 or whom 200,000 live in the capital Phnom Penh. Old communities have been joined by doctors, dentists and businessmen from Shanghai, architects from Taiwan, and investors from Malaysia and Singapore. Since 1990, a major resurgence of Chinese culture has also occurred, and Cambodia's largest and most prestigious Chinese school, Duanhua, has more than 10,000 pupils. This makes it the largest Chinese school in any country where Chinese is not one of the official languages.¹⁹

This "third wave" of Chinese migration as such is not necessarily connected with criminal networks other than gangs involved in illegal aliens' smuggling. But the fact that, for instance, in Cambodia the local Chinese Association is headed by a controversial character like Teng Bunma, a maverick "banker" with underworld connections, has opened the door for all sorts of unsavoury characters, and many criminals have indeed come with the tide. Chinese-owned night clubs in Phnom Penh have become meeting places for Chinese gangsters craving up the local entertainment and drugs scene in the capital, and their web of contacts, their own "bamboo network" as the term goes, seems more akin to the worldwide network of the Triads than mainstream chambers of commerce.²⁰ Thailand has taken some affirmative action against the smuggling networks, but weak law enforcement in Cambodia — and corruption and no transparency at all in Burma — have thwarted any serious effort to stem the trade in human beings. Many Chinese also see the third wave of migration south as a resumption of the centuries-old movement of migrants down to the "Great Golden Peninsula" that is Southeast Asia. But this new, massive third wave also threatens to undermine the position of existing immigrant communities, which over the years have become fairly well assimilated in the respective countries where they live. The new migrants stand out more in their new environment, and that has — as we have seen in the case of northern Burma — caused an overall backlash against all Chinese.

Given the fact that new criminal syndicates are involved in the trade, that there is so much money to be made from it — and that the syndicates are involved also in the drug trade — the human smugglers have undermined the security of several countries in the Golden Triangle region. With their long experience from the heroin trade, the networks which are based in the Golden Triangle will continue to find ways around the law, and new routes along which the migrants can travel. These syndicates are also some of the best-connected, best-organised and most secretive in the world, qualities which also make them the most difficult to crack.

Endnotes

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- 2 See Ann Maxwell Hill, *Merchants and Migrants: Ethnicity and Trade among Yunnanese Chinese in Southeast Asia* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph 47, 1998) and Chiranan Prasertkul, *Trade in the Nineteenth Century: Southwest China's Cross-boundaries Functional System* (Bangkok: Cgualongkorn University, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Monograph 44, 1989).
- 3 See Bertil Lintner, "The Secret War", in *Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948* (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1999), pp. 125-162. The KMT forces in the Golden Triangle are usually, but erroneously, referred to as the "93rd Division," a unit of the 26th Army.
- 4 John LeRoy Christian, *Burma and the Japanese Invader* (Bombay: Thacker & Company, 1945), pp. 278- 285, and Bertil Lintner, Burma (Myanmar) in *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas* (ed. Lynn Pan, Singapore: Archipelago Press and Landmark Books, 1998), pp. 140-145.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 141.
- 6 Lintner, *Burma in Revolt*, pp. 223-239.
- 7 Josef Silverstein, *Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 177-178.
- 8 I met and interviewed many such people during my trek through northern Burma in 1985-87.
- 9 For a detailed account of the 1989 CPB mutiny, see Bertil Lintner, *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma* (Ithaca)
- 10 Anthony Davis and Bruce Hawke, "On the Road to Ruin? Narco-dollars lure Burmese junta toward heroin dependency," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, March 1998. 11 Interviews with Burmese seamen who were involved in the operation, Songkhla, southern Thailand, August 1994.
- 12 Communication with Kolin Chin, an expert on illegal aliens' smuggling, January 1994. Also interviews with people from the former CPB base areas, Ruili, Yunnan, December 1994.
- 13 *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 11, 1999.
- 14 According to numerous interviews with local people, including such "brokers", in Ruili, December 1994.
- 15 See, for instance, "The Python" by Nyi Pu Lay in Anna J. Allot (ed.), *Inked Over, Ripped Out: Burmese Storytellers and the Censors* (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1994), pp. 85-101.
- 16 Bertil Lintner, "The Third Wave," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 24, 1999.
- 17 "Chinese using Thailand as stopover base," *Bangkok Post*, May 10, 2000.
- 18 Interview with Kent Wiedeman, US ambassador to Cambodia, Phnom Penh, May 1, 2000.
- 19 Interview with Kent Wiedeman, US ambassador to Cambodia, Phnom Penh, May 1, 2000. See also W.E. Willmott, "Cambodia," in Pan, *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas*, p. 150.
- 20 Bruce Gilley, "The Exiled Resurgent," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 Jan. 1998.